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Abstract
Time-Triggered Ethernet is a relatively new protocol for safety-critical Local Area Network environments, known for
its reliability and efﬁciency in providing seamless fail-safe communication. This paper presents a formal veriﬁcation
of the TTEthernet protocol, based on an interpretation of the TTEthernet speciﬁcation document, applied to two formal
network scenarios that represent a real-time, safety-critical setting. The conceptual model of both scenarios are modeled
using the probabilistic timed automata, then, encoded into PRISM code. Also, a set of precise functional requirements
is derived from the TTEthernet speciﬁcation document and expressed using PCTL. Using this approach, the TTEthernet
protocol was veriﬁed as applied to real-life network environments and one faulty state was identiﬁed within one of the
settings, thus revealing a possible weak point in TTEthernet protocol.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer]
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1. Introduction
Time-Triggered Ethernet (TTE) [1, 2] is a Local Area Network that builds on top of Ethernet protocol,
adding to it a deterministic time and event layer, based on the functional principles of the Time-Triggered
Protocol (TTP). These two protocols arent to be confused for they are not the same thing, as TTE is applied
to high-level computer systems while TTP is used with networks of simpler electronic components. The in-
frastructure of TTE is designed for mixed criticality systems, which means the protocol can handle seamless
dataﬂow in applications bearing different criticality levels, such as aerospace, health-care or data-backup
networks. For the purpose of this study, the safety-critical aspects of TTE will be considered. The TTE
bases its functionality by assigning a time frame for each node, in which that node will be allowed to send
data. This functionality is known as Time-Triggered communication and it is implemented by synchronizing
the clocks of all active elements that are part of the network.
Despite of its high level of sophistication and the use of formal methods in the development of some of
its control algorithms, TTE protocol was never veriﬁed as a whole real-world network scenario, where all
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components are subject to fail in the most diverse ways, and, as stated in the speciﬁcation document [1],
the protocol may contain faults. Thus, implementation on safety-critical environments, as of today, relies
heavily on simulated test runs and network redundancy, to ensure fault-free functionality at all times.
Our objective is to model a state-driven closed-world scenario encompassing all the elements of a net-
work, making use of the TTE standard. Then, verify the TTE-based network formally by using the PRISM
model checker[3]. The use of PRISM was motivated by its statistical capabilities; it is capable of running
comparative analysis on sets of result values. In order to avoid veriﬁcation process limitations, each sce-
nario is veriﬁed with an adapted veriﬁcation technique. Both network designs are largely based on the TTE
functional descriptions available in [2, 4, 5] and [6] is especially valuable for modeling the clock synchro-
nization function. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time TTE protocol has been veriﬁed as a complete
network scenario at a high-level of abstraction, where the focus is the analysis of the network behaviour as
a system and the veriﬁcation of the relations between the networks multiple components, in detriment of a
low level study of how each component performs its function. This paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents the veriﬁcation approach. The veriﬁcation results are given in section 3. Section 4 discusses the
related work and concludes this paper.
2. The Veriﬁcation Approach
This section brings an approach for the functional requirements and the performance analysis of TTE
protocol designed as Probabilistic Timed Automata (PTA). The proposed approach is illustrated in Figure
1; it consists in modeling each scenario to a corresponding PTA. The Combined PTA of the resulting model
is encoded into PRISM input language and the functional requirements are expressed in Probabilistic Com-
putational Tree Logic (PCTL) in order to evaluate the functionality requirements and the probabilities for
best/worst cases.
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Fig. 1: Time-Triggered Ethernet Veriﬁcation Approach.
2.1. TTE Model Description
Here, we propose two scenarios describing the possible TTE architecture.
Scenario 1. The ﬁrst scenario describes a standard TTE conﬁguration, which consists of a number N of
terminals connected through a TTE switch. Standard TTE provides deterministic time-triggered communi-
cation between nodes without safety-critical protection. As depicted in Figure 2(a), Scenario 1 is composed
by a number of computer nodes connected to a server through a TTE switch. A computer node is formed
by a host computer system and a standard TTE communication controller. A standard TTE switch is com-
posed by a TTE switch and a standard TTE controller. For the sake of this scenario, a few constraints were
incorporated to the network:
• The server is just a data repository and has no effect on the network,
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• Only clients are able to send data and the only destination is the server, with the exception of the
server, hardware failures can be introduced to any element of the network,
• Only one hardware failure may happen at each run,
• Theres a backup shadow switch that will become active,
• All cases of client failure are treated as non-silent failure, where the client will start to continuously
ﬂood the network with garbage data.
Scenario 2. The second scenario describes a Fault-Tolerant TTE Conﬁguration, which consists of a
number N of terminals connected through two or more Fault-Tolerant TTE switches. This setting is used
for safety-critical applications, such as life support equipment. As depicted in Figure 2(b), Scenario 2 is
composed by a number of computer nodes connected through two Fault-Tolerant TTE switches, in a star
topology. A computer node is formed by a host computer system and a Fault-Tolerant TTE communication
controller. A Fault-Tolerant TTE switch is composed by a TTE switch and a Fault-Tolerant TTE controller.
(a) Scenario 1. (b) Scenario 2.
Fig. 2: TTE Topologies.
The switches in Fault-Tolerant and in Standard TTE are very similar; the main difference being the
TTE Guardian Function present in the Fault-Tolerant TTE switches. In this work, the guardian function
implements a Leaky Bucket ﬂow control algorithm, as stated previously. The same constraints used in
scenario 1 are valid for scenario 2, with only a few differences: Theres no server in this scenario, Clients
will send data to one-another, and any two hardware failures can occur at each run.
2.2. TTE Formal Model
From TTE description, we consider TTE as a set of objects communicating via ordered messages. We
propose to design our scenarios around basic constructions of clients and switches (Figure 4). These models
show the main functionality of each component in the network. These components are combined to form
scenarios 1 and 2. Formally, we deﬁne TTE protocol in Deﬁnition 1.
Deﬁnition 1 (TTE Protocol). A TTE Protocol is a tuple TTE = (Obj,Int,Order), where:
• Obj is the set of objects that deﬁne the actors such as server S, clientsC and switchesW ,
• Int = m1, . . . ,mn is a sequence of messages of size n. Each message is a tuple mi = (Si,Ni,Gi,Ti)
where Si is the source, Ni is the message content, Gi is a guard and Ti is the message target,
• Order : Int→N×N, is a function assigning to each message its order in the source and the target
objects.
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To verify scenarios 1 and 2, we use PCTL to express their related speciﬁcations. Formally, PCTL syntax is
given as follows:
φ ::=  | ap | φ ∧φ | ¬φ | P p[ψ ] and ψ ::= Xφ | φU≤kφ | φUφ .
Where “ap” is an atomic proposition, k∈N, p∈ [0,1], and ∈{<,≤,>,≥}. “∧” represents the conjunction
operator and “¬” is the negation operator. “X”, “U≤k” and “U are the next, the bounded until and the until
temporal logic operators, respectively.
Fig. 3: Probabilistic Timed Automata of TTE Switch.
Scenario 1. This scenario uses a simpleMaster/Slave one-step synchronization protocol where the single
master will calculate the synchronization clock, based on its internal clock, and broadcast it to the rest of
the network, thus we ignore the TTE compression function.
Deﬁnition 2 (Scenario 1). The ﬁrst scenario is a special instantiation of TTE-uple such as:
• Obj is a collection of servers, switches, and clients,
• Int is a set of messages,
• Order : Int→N×N is an order function.
For Scenario 1, we prove in Proposition 1 that if a PCTL property φi proper to a nodeCi is satisﬁed then
its similar one for node j is satisﬁed too.
Proposition 1 (Scenario 1). For a given node Ci that communicates with a server S via a switch W as in
the form of Scenario1, we have:
1. S‖W‖Ci |= φi ⇒ ∀ j > 0 : S‖W‖Ci‖Cj |= φi where φi propositions exclude Nj variables.
2. S‖W‖Ci |= φi ⇒ ∀ j > 0 : S‖W‖Cj |= φ j where φ j is the symmetric PCTL expression of φi with to
Cj variables.
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PROOF. Before discussing the proof of each case, note that the composition operator “‖” is commutative
and associative. Those two properties help to generalize both case of this proposition to cover n nodes.
1. The ﬁrst proof is based on the cone of inﬂuence for the nodeCj. This is done for each term of PCTL
syntax.
2. The second proof is based on the structure of Ci and Cj. By deﬁnition, we consider thatCi ≡Cj . The
satisfaction of PCTL properties follows a structural induction on PCTL syntax.
Similarly, it is true for more than one SwitchWi:i>0 or Server S j: j>0.
Scenario 2. This scenario simulates a safety-critical network with double-failure hypothesis and a multi-
master two-step clock synchronization, where the existence of more than one synchronization master re-
quires an extra step for generating the synchronization clock. The multiple synchronization masters will
send a control frame each to a compression master that will calculate an average value based on the laten-
cies of those control frames as they arrive. Then, the compression master sends a new control frame that will
be used to synchronize the local clocks in the synchronization masters, as described in [4]. This scenario is
deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 3 (Scenario 2). The second scenario is a TT implementation where:
• Obj is a collection of switches and clients,
• Int is a set of messages,
• Order : Int→N×N is a function that assign for each message its order.
The conﬁguration consists of ﬁve nodes (clients) and two switches/ guardians on a star network con-
ﬁguration. The guardian uses a Leaky Bucket function. Every connection is redundant. There is a backup
shadow-switch in case of catastrophic hardware failure of one of the original switches. In this scenario any
two faults can happen at any given time with the only exception being that only one switch may fail per
run since the scenario has only one backup and the safety-critical protocol requires at least two functioning
switches.
For Scenario 2, we derive the symmetry property of the communicated nodes as given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Scenario 2). Let Ci and Cj two nodes communicate as in Scenario 2, we have:
1. Ci ‖ Wk ‖ Cj |= φi ⇔ Ci ‖ Wk ‖ Cj |= φ j where φ j is symmetric to φi with respect to the propositions
of Ci and Cj.
2. Gk ‖ Cj |= φi ⇔ Gk ‖ Cj |= φ j where φ j expression is equivalent to that of φi but φ j propositions
are proper to Cj.
PROOF. The proof is similar to the previous proposition.
1. The ﬁrst is based on the structural equivalence of both properties φi and φ j. By assuming that φi is
symmetric to φ j for the propositions in Cj . And, we have by deﬁnition Ci ≡ Cj and ‖ composition
operator preserves the satisfaction of PCTL properties under adversaries. We found that the ﬁrst part
of proposition holds.
2. The second part is deduced by applying the cone of inﬂuence on the ﬁrst one.
For the generalization case, we have the commutativity and the associativity of the composition operator
“‖”. Then, Proposition 2 holds for more than one node or one switch.
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2.3. TTE PRISM Representation
The network scenarios are coded in PRISM as interdependent modules. The diagrams were coded
to handle TTE properties, such as Predictable and Deterministic message transfer, strong fault isolation,
scalability, seamless communication and no single point of failure. Due to the space limitations, we present
only the Channel PRISM code and we describe the switch and the client codes.
The Channel Process: The network models have one instance of ”Transmission Channel” for every
connection between a client node and a switch. The channel has two state variables, ch and failure. The ﬁrst
is used to keep track of the transmission state of the channel and the latter is used to implement a physical
failure logic. As long as the channel is fault-free (failure = 0) it is susceptible to a 0.05 percent chance of
having a physical failure. Listing 1 shows a simpliﬁed code for the channel module.
Listing 1: Channel PRISM Code Fragment.
Module Channel A
ch1 : [ 0 . . 3 ] i n i t 0 ;
f a i l 1 : [ 0 . . 1 ] i n i t 0 ;
[Msnd ] ( ch1 =0)&( f a i l 1 =0) −> ( ch1 ’ = 1 ) ;
[ rcvC ] ( ch1 =1)&( f a i l 1 =0) −> ( ch1 ’ = 2 ) ;
[ Csnd ] ( ch1 =2)&( f a i l 1 =0) −> ( ch1 ’ = 3 ) ;
[ r c v ] ( ch1 =3)&( f a i l 1 =0) −> ( ch1 ’ = 0 ) ;
[ Csnd ] ( ch1 =0)&( f a i l 1 =1) −> ( ch1 ’ = 1 ) ;
[ Csnd ] ( ch1 =1)&( f a i l 1 =1) −> ( ch1 ’ = 2 ) ;
[ Csnd ] ( ch1 =2)&( f a i l 1 =1) −> ( ch1 ’ = 3 ) ;
[ Csnd ] ( ch1 =3)&( f a i l 1 =1) −> ( ch1 ’ = 0 ) ;
[ ] ( f a i l 1 =0) −> 0 . 0 5 : ( f a i l 1 ’ = 0 ) + 0 . 9 5 : ( f a i l 1 ’ = 1 ) ;
endmodule
The Switch Process: In the switch module, every transmission is guarded by the state of the timer
module and the transmission must be synchronized with the state of Channel module. This structure ensures
Deterministic Communication, where no two messages can be sent at the same time. This measure is part
of the Guardian Function of TTE. In PRISM, fault tolerance was modeled by restraining every ”send” and
”receive” action to a rendezvous connection between Client, Channel and Switch modules.
The Client Process: The Client module is constructed around the principles and boundaries of the Chan-
nel module. Every client has a unique ID number which the network will use to identify which client is
currently active. This allows every message to be traced back to its origin, ensuring that the network meets
the TTE property ”Consistent Diagnosis”.
3. TTE Veriﬁcation
To guarantee that the proposed scenarios fall under the TTE speciﬁcations, a set of eight properties
is proposed that, if held true, will ensure the models conformance with TTE. The actual veriﬁcation is
performed by placing a set of state-triggered Boolean ﬂags into the PRISM code. Whenever a relevant state
is reached, a speciﬁc ﬂag will be turned to mark that event (eg. Entering or exiting transmission mode). To
circumvent veriﬁcation limits, veriﬁcation is performed over two symmetrical nodes in the network. Then
the results are formally generalized in order to cover N nodes, by applying the proved propositions. The
properties are expressed in PCTL for a generic node ”A” and expressed as a set of assertions that should
always hold true, about the aforementioned ﬂags.
1. The transmission only starts after successful synchronization of the node;
Pmax=? [ G !(!”Synch A” & ”Tr A”) ]
Where ”Synch” represents that the node has successfully synchronized with the network and ”Tr”
shows that a transmission is in process.
2. A transmission only occurs if all nodes are synchronized;
Pmax=? [G !( ”Tr A” &(!”Synch A” | !”Synch B”|. . .| !”Synch n”)]
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3. At any given point in time there’s only one node sending a message;
Pmax=? [G (”Tr A”⇒ (!”Tr B” & !”Tr C” & . . .& !”Tr n”) ]
4. A node only sends on its time partition;
Pmax=? [G (”Tr A”⇒ ”Time A”) ]
Where ”Time A” represents the time partition assigned to “A”.
5. Every node has its own unique time partition;
Pmax=? [G (”Tp A” & ”Tp B” & . . .&”Tp N”) ]
Where: “Tp A=(∀ B A”:Time A Time B).
6. A sent packet will be received by the destination;
Pmax=? [G (”Snd A”⇒ F ”Rcv B”) ]
Where ”Snd” represents that a packet has been sent and ”Rcv” represents that a packet has been
received.
7. To every message sent ”Snd A” there would be an acknowledgement”Ack A”;
Pmax=? [G (”Snd A”⇒ F ”Ack A”)].
8. Every transmission (Tr A) will eventually end (Tend A).
Pmax=? [G (”Tr A”⇒ F ”Tend A”) ].
In a control veriﬁcation, assuming no hardware failure would even occur, both scenarios were success-
fully veriﬁed for all properties, validating them within TTE speciﬁcation. Then a second veriﬁcation for
each scenario was performed, this time having a set probability for each hardware component to fail. In this
second run, a state was found within the second scenario in which two of the properties did not hold true.
Table 1 displays the veriﬁcation times and results for all eight properties of the second scenario. The
faulty state violates the third and the fourth properties and it may be reached when one of the switches and
one of the clients fail at the exact same time. Whenever a switch fails, communication will be frozen and
the backup switch will boot and the synchronization function will synchronize the clocks of both switches
and then broadcast the new clock-synch to the entire network, allowing communication to resume. In this
particular case where the client fails at the same time as the switch, there is a chance that the random data
from the clients non-silent failure will collide with the broadcast message from the switch, making the
failure to pass unnoticed by the guardians. After this, there is a chance that the second garbage message
from the failing client will collide with the new clock synch coming from the switches and, after this, theres
a chance that another node will be assigned to the same time partition that is being used by the failing client.
When this state is reached, well have two nodes assigned to the same time partition, plus one failing node
which is not yet known to the networks guardians.
Table 1: Veriﬁcation Results
Property # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.28
Result 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Figure 4(a) and 4(b) show the plotted results of failure rates pertaining Clients and Switches in network
scenario 2, assuming components with different failure probabilities. Each components likeness to fail is
given in function of transmission round (K). In this test, ”Client 1” is the control node with zero chance
of failure. The remaining clients probability to fail increase at a constant rate of 0.05 (per cent) -a value
arbitrarily chosen just for the sake of this test. The progression of the failure rate is linear for all clients and
all switches, due to the deterministic nature of TTE.
4. Related Work and Conclusions
Most related work focus on design and implementation of TTE protocol. [5] develops a TTE controller
for real-time applications, built on top of a 100Mbit Ethernet controller. It covers TTE architecture and
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(a) Client. (b) Switch.
Fig. 4: Failure Rates.
functionality. [6] presents how TTE switch handles Time and Event-triggered messages and discussing its
general behavior at low-level and how the switch handles predictable real-time communication. [2] have
a presentation of the elements that are present in a TTE setting including its main functions and services,
its basic deﬁnitions, and the protocol’s requirements. [4] discuss an integration of TTE with SpaceWire
networks for aerospace applications. This work covers the dataﬂow and synchronization in TTE. [7] focuses
on the Compression Function of TTE, which is a clock synchronization function that runs inside the TTE
switches collecting clock data from the connected systems.
[8] implements the speciﬁcations of a synchronous model on a distributed real-time platform while
maintaining the semantic equivalence between the model and the implementation. [9] discourses about
synchronous fault-tolerant systems by presenting how synchronous systems can be implemented as time-
triggered (TT) systems. [10] extends [9] by generalizing the theory to accommodate time-triggered proper-
ties, like event-trigger, communication delays, reception windows, non-static clock and pipelined rounds.
Compared to the related work, we used probabilistic timed automata to model two real-time network
scenarios using TTE protocol and veriﬁed them by using PRISM Model checker, to build a high-level
software implementation. Our models are the most accurate form to represent a TTE network on the PRISM
tool. In addition, we have proposed two techniques to accelerate further the checking of the models. We
were able to identify one circumstance where TTE’s properties will not be respected, likely resulting in
catastrophic network failure.
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